

NOTES

One to priesthood and one to *teruma* – תיחד לכהונה וחד לתרומה: *Tosafot* ask: Why doesn't the Gemara suggest that once the verse deems a *sota* defiled with regard to her husband, it should follow that she is disqualified from ever marrying a priest or from partaking of *teruma* if her husband is a priest, as she is assumed to have committed adultery? They answer, somewhat cryptically, that absent the additional verses one could have said that a *sota* is considered defiled only with regard to her husband, as there could be court-imposed capital punishment because of him. The *Eshel Avraham* explains that *Tosafot* mean that even if the wife had not in fact committed adultery, her improper behavior will eventually lead to her doing so, which will render her liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment, in the event that she is caught in the act in the presence of witnesses. Therefore, it is preferable that she become forbidden to her husband until she drinks the bitter water, and she is forbidden to her husband in order that he will be more likely to make her drink the bitter water. However, this should not be taken as an indication that the verse regards her as having been defiled, and as such, one cannot assume that she will become forbidden to a priest or to partake of *teruma*.

Keren Ora suggests another explanation as to why the *halakha* that a *sota* is forbidden to her husband does not serve as proof with regard to *teruma* and marrying a priest: The reason she is forbidden to her husband could be that even if she did not actually engage in sexual intercourse, her promiscuous behavior was clearly contrary to her husband's warning and warranted his disapproval. This unique prohibition for the husband, however, does not apply to the other matters under discussion.

A matter that can be derived through an *a fortiori* inference, etc. – מילתא דאיתא בקל וחומר וכו': This principle, which is cited in many places in the Talmud, states that although the Torah will not repeat explicit *halakhot* more than once if it is not teaching a specific novelty, the Torah will state a *halakha* explicitly although it could be derived through an *a fortiori* inference. The reason why a *halakha* that could be derived through logical reasoning might be stated explicitly could be either to emphasize the *halakha*, or to provide it with the additional power that only *halakhot* stated explicitly in the Torah have, such as the ability of the court to punish one who violates such a *halakha*.

BACKGROUND

An *a fortiori* inference – קל וחומר: One of the fundamental principles of rabbinic exegesis, an *a fortiori* inference appears in all of the standard lists of exegetical principles. In essence, it is a principle of logical argumentation where a comparison is drawn between two cases, one more lenient and the other more stringent. The *a fortiori* inference asserts that if the *halakha* is stringent in a case where the ruling is usually lenient, then all the more so will it be stringent in a more serious case; likewise, if the *halakha* is lenient in a case where the ruling is not usually lenient, then it will certainly be lenient in a less stringent case. *A fortiori* inferences appear in the Bible, and the Sages compiled lists of verses in which they appear. For example: "If you have run with the foot soldiers, and they have wearied you, how can you contend with horses?" (Jeremiah 12:5).

שהרי עשה בה ספק זונה בזונה, תרומה נמי לא תיבעי קרא, שהרי עשה בה ספק זונה בזונה!

אלא, לרבי עקיבא ארבעה קראי בתמי: חד לבועל, וחד לבועל, וחד לכהונה וחד לתרומה;

ורבי ישמעאל תלתא קראי בתמי: חד לבועל, וחד לבועל וחד לתרומה, וכהונה איתא בקל וחומר.

ורבי ישמעאל, ממאי דאיצטריך קרא לתרומה, וכהונה איתא בקל וחומר? דילמא כי אצטריך לכהונה, ותרומה שריא!

אמר לך: מסתברא דומיא דבעל ובעל, מה בעל ובעל מחיים, אף תרומה נמי מחיים, לאפוקי פהונה דלאחר מיתה.

ורבי עקיבא – דומיא דבעל ובעל לית ליה;

ואי נמי אית ליה, מילתא דאיתא בקל וחומר טרח וכתב לה קרא.

as the Torah has already rendered an uncertain case of a woman who has engaged in sexual intercourse with a man forbidden to her by the Torah [*zona*] as though she is certainly a *zona*, since a *sota* is forbidden to her husband after seclusion even though there are no witnesses that she committed adultery, and therefore it should be prohibited for her to marry a priest just like any *zona*, then with regard to her prohibition against partaking of *teruma* a verse should also not be necessary, as it is prohibited for a *zona* to partake of *teruma*. Therefore, the Torah renders an uncertain *zona* like a certain *zona*.

Rather, it must be explained that according to Rabbi Akiva, the equivalent of four verses worthy of exposition are written with regard to the defilement of a *sota*, as he maintains that an additional *halakha* should be derived from the superfluous prefix *vav* in the verse: "And is defiled [*venitma'a*]" (Numbers 5:29). Therefore, one verse is written to forbid her to her husband, and one is to forbid her to her paramour, and one is to forbid her to marry into the priesthood, and one is to forbid her to partake of *teruma*.^N

And Rabbi Yishmael disagrees with Rabbi Akiva, as he does not expound on the superfluous *vav*, and therefore maintains that only three verses are written: One is to forbid her to her husband, and one is to forbid her to her paramour, and one is to forbid her to partake of *teruma*. And her being prohibited to marry into the priesthood is derived through an *a fortiori* inference,^B as described in the *baraita*.

The Gemara asks: And from where does Rabbi Yishmael derive that the verse was necessary to teach the prohibition of a *sota* to partake of *teruma*, and her prohibition against marrying into the priesthood is derived through an *a fortiori* inference? Perhaps the verse was necessary in order to teach that it is prohibited for the woman to marry into the priesthood, but *teruma* is permitted for her?

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yishmael could have said to you: It is reasonable to derive from this verse a prohibition that is similar to the prohibitions derived from the other verses, i.e., that she is forbidden to her husband and her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband and her paramour even during the lifetime of her husband, so too, the prohibition against partaking of *teruma* applies also during the lifetime of her husband, to the exclusion of her prohibition against marrying into the priesthood, which is relevant only after the death of her husband. The reason is that if her husband would divorce her it would be prohibited for her to marry a priest anyway.

And how would Rabbi Akiva respond? The Gemara answers: He is not of the opinion that it is more reasonable to derive a prohibition from the phrase "and is defiled" that is similar to the prohibitions involving her husband and her paramour, and therefore he requires two separate derivations; one for *teruma* and one for the priesthood.

Or alternatively, perhaps he accepts the opinion that the *halakha* derived from "and is defiled" should be similar to the prohibitions involving the husband and paramour, but nevertheless, in certain instances with regard to a matter that can be derived through an *a fortiori* inference,^N the verse nevertheless takes the trouble and writes explicitly. Therefore, although unnecessary, two verses are stated, one for *teruma* and one for the priesthood.

The Gemara continues discussing the *baraita*. Rav Giddel said that Rav said: The *halakha* with regard to an entity that has awareness in order for it to be asked and an entity that lacks awareness in order for it to be asked in cases of uncertain ritual impurity is derived from this verse: “And the flesh that touches any impure thing shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 7:19). This would seem to indicate that specifically food that is impure for certain is that which shall not be eaten, but food for which it is uncertain whether it is impure and uncertain whether it is pure can be eaten.

However, say the latter clause of the verse: “And as for the flesh, every one that is pure may eat the flesh” (Leviticus 7:19), which would seem to indicate that specifically one who is pure for certain is one who shall eat meat, but one for whom it is uncertain whether he is impure and uncertain whether he is pure shall not eat. The two clauses in the verse seem to contradict one another with regard to the status of uncertain purity.

Rather, must one not conclude from it that the Torah differentiates between two different types of uncertainty? Here, the latter clause, which discusses “every one that is pure,” is referring to an entity that has awareness in order for it to be asked, e.g., a person, who is considered impure if he is uncertain whether he contracted ritual impurity. There, the former clause which discusses impure meat presents the principle of an entity that lacks awareness in order for it to be asked, where an uncertain case of ritual impurity is deemed pure.

The Gemara explains the need for two separate derivations concerning uncertain contractions of ritual impurity: And the derivation that Rav Giddel said that Rav said was necessary, and it was also necessary to derive the principle of uncertain ritual impurity from *sota*; since if it were derived only through the derivation of Rav, I would say that it makes no difference whether the uncertain contraction of impurity occurred in the private domain or whether it occurred in the public domain. Therefore, it was necessary to derive from *sota* that uncertain impurity is considered impure only in the private domain.

And if it is derived only from *sota*, I would say that similar to *sota*, where both the woman and the paramour possess awareness in order to be asked if they committed the act, so too, items with uncertain impurity should not be deemed impure unless there is awareness on the part of both the one who touches the impure item and the one who causes him to touch,^N i.e., the agent of impurity and the recipient of impurity are both competent people. Therefore, the derivation of Rav was necessary, as it teaches that in an uncertain case of impurity in the private domain, one is deemed impure even if only the contractor of impurity possesses the awareness to be asked.

אמר רב גידל אמר רב: דבר שיש בו דעת לישאל ואין בו דעת לישאל – מהאי קרא נפקא: “והבשר אשר יגע בכל טמא לא יאכל” – ודאי טמא הוא דלא יאכל, הא ספק טמא וספק טהור – יאכל.

אימא סיפא: “והבשר בל טהור יאכל בשר” – ודאי טהור הוא דיאכל בשר, הא ספק טמא וספק טהור – לא יאכל!

אלא לאו שמע מינה: כאן שיש בו דעת לישאל, כאן שאין בו דעת לישאל.

ואיצטריך דרב גידל אמר רב ואיצטריך למיגמר מסוטה; דאי מדרב, הוה אמינא בין ברשות היחיד ובין ברשות הרבים, איצטריך למיגמר מסוטה;

ואי מסוטה, הוה אמינא עד דאיכא דעת נוגע ומגיע, צריכא.

NOTES

Awareness of both the one who touches the impure item and the one who causes him to touch – דעת נוגע ומגיע: The Gemara assumes that the awareness of both parties is not necessary with regard to uncertain ritual impurity. However, the Gemara does not specify which side needs awareness.

The Meiri writes that it does not matter; if either the agent of impurity or the recipient of impurity is a human being the uncertainty is treated stringently. However, Rashi and the Rambam maintain that specifically the recipient must be a person.

Third-degree impurity – שלישי: The further removed an item is from contact with the initial source of ritual impurity, the lower its own level of impurity. An item that comes into contact with the initial source will contract first-degree ritual impurity, and any food that the item touches thereafter will in turn have second-degree ritual impurity, and so on.

HALAKHA

An item of second-degree impurity status can impart third-degree impurity upon *teruma* – שני עושה שלישי – בתרומה: *Teruma* that becomes impure with first- or second-degree ritual impurity can transmit ritual impurity to other *teruma*. *Teruma* that has third-degree impurity is disqualified, but it cannot transmit impurity to other *teruma*, as there is no fourth degree of impurity that applies to *teruma* (Rambam *Sefer Tahara, Hilkhot She'ar Avot HaTumot* 11:3).

”בו ביום דרש רבי עקיבא: וכל כלי חרש בו.”

§ It is stated in the mishna: **On that same day Rabbi Akiva interpreted the phrase “shall be impure” in the verse: “And every earthen vessel into which any of them falls, whatever is in it shall be impure [yitma], and you shall break it” (Leviticus 11:33), as indicating that a loaf that has second-degree ritual impurity can render other food with which it comes into contact impure with third-degree impurity.** Rabbi Yehoshua related that Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai had predicted that a future generation would purify a loaf that contracted third-degree impurity, as there is no explicit verse in the Torah stating that this degree of impurity exists.

ומאחר דאין לו, למה טמא?

The Gemara asks: **But since the loaf does not have an explicit verse stating that it is impure, why did Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai himself maintain that it is impure?**

אמר רב יהודה אמר רב: מן התורה אין לו, מדין קל וחומר יש לו: ומה טבול יום שמתר בחולין – פוסל בתרומה, כבר שני שפסול בחולין – אינו דין שיעשה שלישי בתרומה.

Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai maintained that although it has no explicit basis from a verse in the Torah, it has proof for its impurity through an *a fortiori* inference: **If even one who immersed in a ritual bath that day and will become completely purified after nightfall, who is therefore permitted to touch non-sacred articles, i.e., he does not transmit impurity to them, disqualifies *teruma* that he touches, then with regard to a loaf that has second-degree impurity as result of contact with an impure item of the first degree, which is disqualified, i.e., it is rendered impure, even if it is non-sacred, isn't it logical that it should impart third-degree impurity⁸ upon *teruma*?**⁹

איכא למיפרך: מה לטבול יום שכן אב הטומאה!

The Gemara challenges: **This *a fortiori* inference can be refuted. What is unique about one who was ritually impure who immersed that day and is waiting for nightfall for the purification process to be completed is that prior to his immersion, he was a primary source of impurity.** He therefore retains his stringent status even after immersion with regard to his capability of disqualifying *teruma*. The loaf, by contrast, has second-degree impurity from the outset, and should therefore be treated more lightly.

תיתי The Gemara answers: **Derive this halakha**

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from one who immersed that day who was never a primary source of impurity, as he was rendered impure only through contact with a **creeping animal**, and nevertheless he disqualifies *teruma* upon contact.

מה לטבול יום דשרץ שכן במינו אב הטומאה!

The Gemara continues to challenge the inference: **What is unique about the impurity of one who immersed that day who was rendered impure through contact with a creeping animal is that this impurity can apply to either a person or a utensil, as people and utensils are capable of achieving purity through immersion, and within its type there can be a primary source of impurity.** A loaf, however, is food, which can never be a primary source of impurity. It can only be rendered impure as a secondary source of impurity.

כלי חרש יוכיח.

The Gemara answers: The *halakhot* of an earthenware vessel can prove that the fact that there are primary sources of impurity within its type is not a relevant factor. An earthenware vessel can never become a primary source of impurity, and nevertheless, if it is impure it disqualifies *teruma* upon contact.

מה לכלי חרש שכן מטמא מאוירו!

The Gemara challenges: **What is unique about an earthenware vessel is that unlike a loaf, it can render items impure or it can itself become impure from its airspace.** An earthenware vessel is the only vessel that does not require direct contact with another item in order to contract or transfer impurity, but can effect or contract impurity through its airspace.

טבול יום יוכיח.

The Gemara answers: **One who immersed that day can prove that being able to render items impure through airspace is not a relevant factor.** Such an item disqualifies *teruma*, but imparts impurity only through direct contact and not through its airspace.

That non-sacred food they come into contact with is permitted – שְׁמוֹתֵיין בְּחֻלִּין – Rashi rejects this version of the text, as an earthenware vessel can have only first-degree impurity and therefore will always render impure any non-sacred food that comes into contact with it. Rabbeinu Meshullam suggests that the Gemara is referring to an earthenware vessel that was purified by means of breaking the vessel, but was not broken entirely. In this case, although there is still a minor degree of impurity in the vessel, the degree is not enough to transmit impurity to non-sacred food. Rabbeinu Tam rejects the opinion of Rabbeinu Meshullam, claiming that there is no source that indicates that any level of impurity remains in the broken shards of an earthenware vessel. Other commentaries present alternative explanations of the text.

HALAKHA

From where...do we derive that third-degree impurity applies to sacrificial food – מִנֵּה...מִנְּלֵן – שְׁלִישֵׁי לְקוֹדֶשׁ: Sacrificial food that contracts impurity of the first, second, or third degree is considered impure, and can impart impurity to other sacrificial food. However, sacrificial food that contracts fourth-degree impurity is merely disqualified, and cannot impart impurity to other sacrificial food, as there is no fifth degree of impurity, even with regard to sacrificial food (Rambam *Sefer Tahara, Hilkhot She'ar Avot HaTumot* 11:4).

And the derivation has reverted to its starting point. **The aspect of this case is not like the aspect of that case and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case**, as each case has its own unique stringencies. However, **their common denominator is that non-sacred food they come into contact with is permitted**,^N i.e., is not rendered impure, **but they disqualify *teruma***. Therefore, Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai infers *a fortiori* that **all the more so, a loaf that contracted second-degree impurity, which is disqualified**, i.e., rendered impure, even if it is **non-sacred**, should also **disqualify *teruma*** with which it comes into contact. This was Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai's logical *a fortiori* inference that led him to rule that a loaf of second-degree impurity status disqualifies *teruma*.

And another generation, i.e., the later generation that Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai predicted would deem *teruma* that came into contact with second-degree impurity pure, would **refute** this inference as follows: **What is unique about their common denominator is that both cases have a stringent aspect** that does not exist in other impure items.

And Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai maintained that *teruma* that came into contact with second-degree impurity is pure, as he **would not refute** an inference that is based on two sources due to the fact that both sources have a **stringent aspect**, since each source's stringency is not shared by the other.

S It is taught in a *baraita* (*Tosefta, Hagiga* 3:18) that Rabbi Yosei said: **From where** is it derived with regard to sacrificial food with fourth-degree ritual impurity **that it is disqualified** although it is not capable of imparting impurity to other items?

It is derived through logical inference: **Just as one who is lacking atonement**, e.g., a *zav* or leper who immersed at the conclusion of his period of impurity but has not yet brought an offering for his atonement, **who is permitted** to partake of *teruma*, nevertheless **disqualifies sacrificial food** if he comes into contact with it, so too, with regard to an item of **third-degree impurity status, which disqualifies *teruma*** and is therefore more severe than one who is lacking atonement, **is it not logical that it should render sacrificial food with which it comes into contact as having fourth-degree impurity?**

The *baraita* concludes: **And we have therefore derived** that third-degree impurity applies to sacrificial food **from** an explicit verse in the Torah, **and we have derived** that fourth-degree impurity applies to sacrificial food by means of the above *a fortiori* inference.

The Gemara asks: **From where in the Torah do we derive** that third-degree impurity applies to sacrificial food?¹¹ The Gemara answers: **As it is written:** “**And the flesh that touches any impure thing shall not be eaten**” (Leviticus 7:19). **Are we not dealing** in the verse with meat **that touches** even an item of **second-degree impurity? And the Merciful One states** that it “**shall not be eaten**,” indicating that it assumes third-degree impurity. Therefore, **fourth-degree impurity can be derived by means of the *a fortiori* inference of Rabbi Yosei, as we stated above.**

Rabbi Yohanan says: With regard to the reasoning behind the Distinguished Rabbi Yosei's *a fortiori* inference, **I do not know what it is, as the response to his inference is right by its side:** Food whose impurity came from contact with **one who immersed that day can prove** that a degree of impurity that disqualifies *teruma* does not necessarily impart fourth-degree impurity to sacrificial food, as this food **disqualifies *teruma*** upon contact, **but it does not impart fourth-degree impurity upon sacrificial food.**

וְחֹזֵר הַדִּין, לֹא רָאִי זֶה כְּרָאִי זֶה וְלֹא רָאִי זֶה כְּרָאִי זֶה. הַצַּד הַשְּׂוֹה שְׁבֵהן – שְׁמוֹתֵיין בְּחֻלִּין וּפּוֹסְלִין בְּתְרוּמָה, כֹּל שֶׁבֶן כֶּבֶד שְׁנֵי שְׁפוֹסֵל בְּחֻלִּין דְּפוֹסֵל בְּתְרוּמָה.

וְדוֹ אַחַר פְּרִיךְ: מִה לְהַצִּד הַשְּׂוֹה שְׁבֵהן שֶׁבֶן יֵשׁ בְּהֵן צַד חֲמוּר.

וְרַבֵּן יוֹחָנָן בֶּן זַבְאִי, צַד חֲמוּר לֹא פְרִיךְ.

תֵּנִינָא, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: מִנֵּה לְרִבְעֵי בְּקוֹדֶשׁ שְׁפוֹסֵל?

וְדִין הוּא: מִה מְחוֹסֵר בִּיפּוּרִים שְׁמוֹתֵין בְּתְרוּמָה – פּוֹסֵל בְּקוֹדֶשׁ, שְׁלִישֵׁי שְׁפוֹסֵל בְּתְרוּמָה – אֵינוֹ דִּין הוּא שְׁנֵיעֶשֶׂה רִבְעֵי בְּקוֹדֶשׁ;

וְלִמְדֵנוּ שְׁלִישֵׁי לְקוֹדֶשׁ מִן הַתּוֹרָה, וְרִבְעֵי מִקֵּל וְחוּמָר.

שְׁלִישֵׁי לְקוֹדֶשׁ מִן הַתּוֹרָה מִנֵּה? דְּכַתִּיב: וְהַבֶּשֶׂר אֲשֶׁר יַעֲבֹר בְּכָל טָמֵא לֹא יֵאָכֵל – מִי לֹא עֹסְקִינָן דְּנִגְעַת בְּשֵׁנִי, וְאָמַר רַחֲמֵנָא: לֹא יֵאָכֵל. רִבְעֵי מִקֵּל וְחוּמָר, כִּדְאָמְרוּ.

אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: טַעַם בְּרִיבֵי אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ מֵהוּא, שְׁהֵי תִשׁוּבְתוֹ בְּצַדוֹ: אוֹכֵל הֶבֶא מִחֲמַת טְבוּל יוֹם יוֹכִיחַ, שְׁפוֹסֵל בְּתְרוּמָה וְאֵינוֹ עוֹשֶׂה רִבְעֵי בְּקוֹדֶשׁ!

Just as he disqualifies *teruma* foods, etc. – כָּשֶׁם שְׁפוּסָל – One who immersed that day is considered to have second-degree impurity status. Consequently, he disqualifies *teruma* foods and liquids by touching them. Even if he touches sacrificial food, it is merely disqualified, assuming fourth-degree impurity status, but it cannot impart impurity to other sacrificial food. This is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis (Rambam *Sefer Tahara, Hilkhot She'ar Avot HaTumot* 10:3).

דְּתַנָּא, אַבָּא שְׁאוּל אָמַר: טְבוּל יוֹם
תְּחִילָה לְקוּדֵשׁ, לְטֵמֵא שְׁנַיִם וְלִפְסוּל
אֶחָד;

As it is taught in a *baraita* (*Tosefta, Teharot* 1:4) that Abba Shaul says: With regard to **one who immersed that day**, until sunset he is treated as one who is impure with **first-degree impurity vis-à-vis sacrificial food**, in that he is able to **render two items of sacrificial food impure and to disqualify one** additional item. In other words, the first item of sacrificial food that he touches assumes the status of a second-degree impurity. A second item that comes into contact with the first one assumes third-degree impurity. A third item that comes into contact with the second assumes fourth-degree impurity and is therefore disqualified from being eaten, though it cannot impart impurity to other items.

רַבִּי מֵאִיר אָמַר: מִטֵּמֵא אֶחָד וּפְּוֹסֵל
אֶחָד; וְחֻכְמַיִם אָמְרִים: כְּשֶׁם שְׁפוּסָל
אוֹכְלֵי תְרוּמָה וּמִשְׁקֵי תְרוּמָה, כִּן
פּוֹסֵל אוֹכְלֵי קוּדֵשׁ וּמִשְׁקֵי קוּדֵשׁ.

Rabbi Meir says: One who immersed that day is considered impure with second-degree impurity, even vis-à-vis sacrificial food, and as such **renders only one item impure and disqualifies one** additional item. **And the Rabbis say: Just as he merely disqualifies *teruma* foods^h and *teruma* liquids**, without transferring to them impurity that can then be transferred further, **so too, he merely disqualifies sacrificial foods and sacrificial liquids**. In other words, the impurity imparted by one who immersed that day can reach only third-degree impurity and not fourth-degree impurity, contrary to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.

מִתְקִיף לָהּ רַב פֶּפֶּא: מִמַּאי דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי
כְּרַבְנֵן סְבִירָא לֵיהּ? דִּילְמָא כְּאַבָּא
שְׁאוּל סְבִירָא לֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר: לְטֵמֵא
שְׁנַיִם וְלִפְסוּל אֶחָד!

Rav Pappa objects to Rabbi Yoḥanan's argument: **From where** is the presumption derived **that Rabbi Yosei holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis? Perhaps he holds in accordance with the opinion of Abba Shaul, who says** that one who immersed that day is able to **render two items of sacrificial food impure, and to disqualify one** additional item.

אִי סְלֵקָא דְּעַתְדָּךְ כְּאַבָּא שְׁאוּל סְבִירָא
לֵיהּ, לֵייתִיָּה לְרַבִּיעֵי בְּקוּדֵשׁ מֵאוֹכֵל
שְׂבָא מִחֻמַּת טְבוּל יוֹם:

The Gemara answers: **If it enters your mind that Rabbi Yosei holds in accordance with the opinion of Abba Shaul, he should have brought proof for the existence of a fourth degree of ritual impurity with regard to sacrificial food from the case of food whose impurity came from one who immersed that day**, as follows:

וּמָה אוֹכֵל הֵבֵא מִחֻמַּת טְבוּל יוֹם,
דְּטְבוּל יוֹם גּוֹפִיָּה מוֹתֵר בְּחוּלִין –
אָמַרְתָּ עוֹשֶׂה רְבִיעֵי בְּקוּדֵשׁ, אוֹכֵל

Just as with regard to food whose impurity came from one who immersed that day, while the one who immersed that day is himself permitted to consume non-sacred food, nevertheless you say that the food **imparts fourth-degree impurity status upon sacrificial food**, then with regard to food